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Tēma: Notikumi pasaulē, EU/ASV,NATO u.tml.
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Lafter  | | 08. Oct 2024, 17:35 |
#9801
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|  Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| The editorial board YESTERDAY 263 Print this page Ukraine is going into its third winter of war with the mood darker than ever. In the east, its troops are losing ground to the grinding advance of their Russian adversaries — albeit at vast cost to Moscow’s forces. With half its power generation shattered, Ukrainians face spending hours a day without light or heat in the coldest months. In Washington and some western capitals, meanwhile — and in the corridors of Kyiv — the mood is shifting: from a determination that the war can end only with Russia’s army driven from Ukraine, to the reluctant recognition that a negotiated settlement that leaves the bulk of the country intact may be the best hope. Yet Kyiv is not being given the support it needs even to achieve that scaled-back goal. Ukraine’s prospects are clouded above all by the danger that Donald Trump wins next month’s US election and seeks a swift end to the war, as he has pledged. Some US and European officials hope Trump could at least be dissuaded from forcing Kyiv into an adverse deal with Moscow that would pose grave risks for future European and American security. Yet grappling simultaneously with an escalating Middle East war, even some western capitals that previously insisted on the need to defeat Russia’s Vladimir Putin militarily are recalibrating their goals. Some Kyiv officials, too, fret in private that they lack the personnel, firepower and western support to recover all territory seized by Russia. There is talk behind closed doors of a deal in which Moscow retains de facto control over the roughly one-fifth of Ukraine it has occupied — though Russia’s sovereignty is not recognised — while the rest of the country is allowed to join Nato or given equivalent security guarantees. Under that umbrella, it could rebuild and integrate with the EU, akin to West Germany in the cold war.
This scenario relies, however, on ambitious assumptions. One is that the US and its allies must be prepared to offer Nato membership or the necessary guarantees, when they have so far been reluuctant to grant Kyiv a binding path into the alliance. It would require a huge and costly deployment of forces by the US and its partners — and leave them on a cold war-style tripwire. A second assumption is that Russia’s president can be induced to negotiate and accept such a scenario. But preventing Ukraine from joining Nato was one of his ostensible war aims. It is doubtful, too, that Putin has an incentive to agree to land-for-peace talks while he believes his forces can still expand their gains. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, presented a “victory plan” in Washington last month that sought to persuade Kyiv’s allies to bolster his position, militarily and diplomatically, and force Moscow to the table. He left empty-handed on two key requests: progress towards Nato, and US permission for Kyiv to use western missiles for long-range strikes on Russian territory. Whether the goal is outright victory or bringing Russia to the table, western allies need to strengthen Ukraine’s hand. The Kremlin can only be pushed into talks on a deal that might be satisfactory for Kyiv, and the west, if it feels the costs of fighting on are too high. And any resolution to the war that enables all or part of Ukraine to survive and prosper will need guarantees of its security. In his remaining three months in office, US President Joe Biden and his European allies should bolster Ukraine as much as possible. The aim ought to be to put Kyiv into the strongest possible position ahead of a Trump presidency, or to provide a foundation on which Kamala Harris can build if she prevails. We cannot yet know how the war will end. But it is within the west’s power — and interest — to help Ukraine regain the upper hand over its foe.
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| Lafter | | 08. Oct 2024, 17:37 |
#9802
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| Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| Ooo
Tests- ple iekopējot Notes visu pirms- tur pipec rights/tearms linki - pilns!
Bet mēs jau nēsam lohi  [ Šo ziņu laboja Lafter, 08 Oct 2024, 17:37:14 ]
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| Lafter | | 08. Oct 2024, 18:49 |
#9803
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| Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| Ukraine faces its darkest hour
In a command post near the embattled eastern Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk, soldiers of the Separate Presidential Brigade bemoan the dithering in Washington about whether Kyiv can use western missiles to strike targets inside Russia. If only they were able to fight “with both hands instead of with one hand tied behind our back”, then Ukraine’s plucky troops might stand a chance against a more powerful Russian army, laments an attack drone operator. Surrounded by video monitors showing the advancing enemy, the battalion’s commander says his objectives have begun to shift.
“Right now, I’m thinking more about how to save my people,” says Mykhailo Temper. “It’s quite hard to imagine we will be able to move the enemy back to the borders of 1991,” he adds, referring to his country’s aim of restoring its full territorial integrity. Once buoyed by hopes of liberating their lands, even soldiers at the front now voice a desire for negotiations with Russia to end the war. Yuriy, another commander on the eastern front who gave only his first name, says he fears the prospect of a “forever war”. “I am for negotiations now,” he adds, expressing his concern that his son — also a soldier — could spend much of his life fighting and that his grandson might one day inherit an endless conflict. “If the US turns off the spigot, we’re finished,” says another officer, a member of the 72nd Mechanised Brigade, in nearby Kurakhove. Ukraine is heading into what may be its darkest moment of the war so far. It is losing on the battlefield in the east of the country, with Russian forces advancing relentlessly — albeit at immense cost in men and equipment.
It is struggling to restore its depleted ranks with motivated and well-trained soldiers while an arbitrary military mobilisation system is causing real social tension. It is also facing a bleak winter of severe power and potentially heating outages. “Society is exhausted,” says Oleksandr Merezhko, chair of the foreign affairs committee of the Ukrainian parliament. At the same time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is under growing pressure from western partners to find a path towards a negotiated settlement, even if there is scepticism about Russia’s willingness to enter talks any time soon and concern that Ukraine’s position is too weak to secure a fair deal right now. “Most players want de-escalation here,” says a senior Ukrainian official in Kyiv. It would be naive to expect the applause we got two years ago The Biden administration is aware that its present strategy is not sustainable because “we are losing the war”, says Jeremy Shapiro, head of the Washington office of the European Council on Foreign Relations. “They are thinking of how to move that war to a greater quiescence.” Most threatening of all for Kyiv is the possibility that Donald Trump wins next month’s US presidential election and tries to impose an unfavourable peace deal on Ukraine by threatening to withhold further military and financial aid. Trump repeated his claim last week that he could rapidly bring an end to the war. Ukraine’s staunchest supporters in Europe may wish to keep it in the fight but lack the weapons stockpiles to do so and have no plan for filling any void left by the US. Kyiv confirmed it was laying the groundwork for future talks in spectacular fashion when its troops seized a swath of Russia’s Kursk region in a surprise cross-border incursion in August. Zelenskyy said the land would serve as a bargaining chip. And last week, in an attempt to shape the thinking of his allies, Zelenskyy visited the US to market his so-called “victory plan”, a formula for bolstering Ukraine’s position before possible talks with Moscow. Zelenskyy described it as a “strategy of achieving peace through strength”.
Stepping into the maelstrom of the US election campaign, he held separate talks with President Joe Biden, vice-president Kamala Harris and her Republican opponent, Trump, to make his case. At one point, Zelenskyy’s US mission veered towards disaster after he was criticised by Trump for resisting peace talks and censured by senior Republicans for visiting a weapons factory in the crucial swing state of Pennsylvania accompanied only by Democratic politicians. But in the end, he persuaded Trump to grant him an audience and salvaged his visit. “It was not a triumph. It was not a catastrophe,” the senior Ukrainian official says of Zelenskyy’s US trip. “It would be naive to expect the applause we got two years ago,” the official adds, referring to the president’s address before Congress in December 2022, for which he received multiple standing ovations and declared that Ukraine would “never surrender”. Yet the Ukrainian leader left Washington empty-handed on two central issues: US permission to use western weapons for long-range strikes on Russian territory; and progress on Ukraine’s bid to join Nato. The Biden administration has resisted both, fearing it could encourage Moscow to escalate the conflict, potentially drawing in the US and other allies. US officials were unimpressed by Zelenskyy’s “victory plan”, which includes requests for massive amounts of western weaponry. An adviser who helped prepare the document says Zelenskyy had no choice but to restate his insistence on Nato membership because anything else would have been perceived as a retreat on the question of western security guarantees, which Ukrainians see as indispensable. The victory plan is an attempt to change the trajectory of the war and bring Russia to the table. Zelenskyy really believes in it Despite Washington’s misgivings, the ability to strike Russian territory is also central to Zelenskyy’s victory plan, says the adviser. While US officials have argued that Russia has already moved strike aircraft beyond the range of western missiles, Ukrainian officials insist there are plenty of other targets such as command centres, weapons caches, fuel depots and logistics nodes. Destroying them could disrupt Moscow’s ability to wage war, show Russian leader Vladimir Putin that his objectives of seizing at least four whole provinces of Ukraine are untenable and disprove his conviction that the west will lose interest in supporting Ukraine. “Russia should not be overestimated,” says Andris Sprūds, Latvia’s defence minister. “It has its vulnerabilities.” Although Zelenskyy’s victory plan restated old objectives, its real significance is that it shifts Ukraine’s war aims from total liberation to bending the war in Kyiv’s favour, says the senior Ukrainian official. “It’s an attempt to change the trajectory of the war and bring Russia to the table. Zelenskyy really believes in it.”
Multiple European diplomats who attended last week’s UN General Assembly in New York say there was a tangible shift in the tone and content of discussions around a potential settlement. They note more openness from Ukrainian officials to discuss the potential for agreeing a ceasefire even while Russian troops remain on their territory, and more frank discussions among western officials about the urgency for a deal. Ukraine’s new foreign minister, Andrii Sybiha, used private meetings with western counterparts on his first trip to the US in the post to discuss potential compromise solutions, the diplomats said, and struck a more pragmatic tone on the possibility of land-for-security negotiations than his predecessor. “We’re talking more and more openly about how this ends and what Ukraine would have to give up in order to get a permanent peace deal,” says one of the diplomats, who was present in New York. “And that’s a major change from even six months ago, when this kind of talk was taboo.” The Ukrainian foreign ministry said: “No territorial compromises were suggested, discussed, or even hinted at during any of the meetings.” Ukrainian public opinion also appears to be more open to peace talks — but not necessarily to the concessions they may require. Polling by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology for the National Democratic Institute in the summer showed that 57 per cent of respondents thought Ukraine should engage in peace negotiations with Russia, up from 33 per cent a year earlier. The survey showed the war was taking an ever heavier toll: 77 per cent of respondents reported the loss of family members, friends or acquaintances, four times as many as two years earlier. Two-thirds said they were finding it difficult or very difficult to live on their wartime income.
Life is about to get even tougher. Russia has destroyed at least half of Ukraine’s power-generating capacity after it resumed mass drone and missile strikes against power stations and grid infrastructure this spring. Ukraine faces a “severe” electricity deficit of up to 6GW, equivalent to a third of peak winter demand, according the International Energy Agency. It is increasingly dependent on its three remaining operational nuclear power plants, the IEA noted. Were Russia to attack substations adjacent to these plants — despite all the obvious dangers — it could cause Ukraine’s power system to collapse, and with it heating and water supply. Central heating facilities in large cities such as Kharkiv and Kyiv are also vulnerable. Another source of tension is mobilisation. Under new legislation, millions of Ukrainian men have been compelled to register for possible service or face hefty fines. At the same time, many Ukrainians know of men who have been randomly stopped at metro or train stations, often late at night, and carted off to mobilisation centres, a brief period of training and then the front line. 55% Share of Ukrainians who remain opposed to any formal cession of territory as part of a peace deal, down from a peak of 87 per cent last year “It is perceived as abusive, worse than if you are a criminal, where there is at least due process,” says Hlib Vyshlinksy, director of the Centre for Economic Strategy in Kyiv. “It tears people apart. The real enemy is Russia, but at the same time they fear a corrupt, abusive enrolment office doing the wrong thing.” If Ukrainians have warmed to the idea of negotiations, a majority — 55 per cent according to a KIIS polling in May — remain opposed to any formal cession of territory as part of a peace deal. “People want peace but they are also against territorial concessions. It is hard to reconcile them,” says Merezhko, the chair of the foreign affairs committee. However, the KIIS survey shows the share of respondents opposed to any territorial concessions has dropped sharply from a peak of 87 per cent early last year. It also found that Ukrainians might be open to a compromise whereby, in return for Ukrainian membership of Nato, Russian maintains de facto control over occupied parts of Ukraine, but not recognised sovereignty. Other polls suggest Ukrainians are still confident of winning and will be disappointed by anything other than total battlefield victory. The biggest domestic problem for Zelenskyy might come from a nationalist minority opposed to any compromise, some of whom are now armed and trained to fight.
“If you get into any negotiation, it could be a trigger for social instability,” says a Ukrainian official. “Zelenskyy knows this very well.” “There will always be a radical segment of Ukrainian society that will call any negotiation capitulation. The far right in Ukraine is growing. The right wing is a danger to democracy,” says Merezhko, who is an MP for Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party. As the KIIS polling shows, making any deal acceptable that allows Russia to stay in the parts of Ukraine it has seized since its first invasion in 2014 will hinge on obtaining meaningful western security guarantees, which for Kyiv means Nato membership. “The most important thing for us is security guarantees. Proper ones. Otherwise it won’t end the war; it will just trigger another one,” says a Ukrainian official. “Land for [Nato] membership is the only game in town, everyone knows it,” says one senior western official. “Nobody will say it out loud . . . but it’s the only strategy on the table.” Nato membership remains Ukraine’s key goal, but very few of the alliance’s 32 members think it is possible without a full, lasting ceasefire and a defined line on the map that determines what portion of Ukraine’s territory the alliance’s mutual defence clause applies to. The model floated by some is West Germany’s membership of the alliance, which lasted more than three decades before the fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification with the east. “The West German model is gaining traction particularly in the White House, which has been the most sceptical about Nato membership,” says Shapiro of the ECFR. “The Russians would hate that, but at least it could be some opening gambit for a compromise.” But even that would require a vast force deployment by the US and its partners that any US administration, Democratic or Republican, would probably balk at, given Washington’s focus on the threat from China. One question would be whether European powers would be willing to shoulder more of the burden.
And would Russia accept Ukraine’s entry into the alliance, an alignment with the west it has been trying to thwart militarily for a decade? Many on both sides of the Atlantic say it is unlikely. “I don’t think Russia would agree to our participation in Nato,” says a senior Ukrainian official. Anything short of full membership is unlikely to be enough to stop the Kremlin’s military aggression. “Even if we get a Nato invitation, it will mean nothing. It’s a political decision,” adds the senior Ukrainian official. In what could be his last trip to Europe before standing down as president, Biden will chair a meeting of Ukraine and its allies in Germany on October 12. A western official briefed on Zelenskyy’s talks in Washington said there were tentative signs that Biden might agree to advance the status of Ukraine’s Nato membership bid before he leaves office in January. As he left the US this weekend, Zelenskyy said that October would be “decision time”. The Ukrainian leader will once again plead for permission to hit targets inside Russia with western-supplied munitions, knowing that it is one of the few options for bringing hostilities to an end. “It’s about constraining Russia’s capabilities” and piling on pressure to get them to open talks, says the senior Ukrainian official. “It’s a real chance if we are thinking about resolving this war.”
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-Cartography by Cleve Jones This article has been updated after publication to include a response from the Ukrainian foreign ministry
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| user | | 08. Oct 2024, 20:36 |
#9804
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| Kopš: 12. May 2020
Ziņojumi: 14341
Braucu ar:
| Jaunais NATO ģenerālsekretārs: Nākamā ziema Ukrainai varētu būt smagākā kopš lielā kara sākuma
Lasìju virsrakstu, atveru rakstu ar domu palasìt ko Karins saka.. a tur kaut kads lohs. Vai tad Karinam tur nebija jabut  | | Offline | | |
| bum_bumz | | 08. Oct 2024, 22:11 |
#9805
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| Kopš: 05. Jan 2006
Ziņojumi: 7446
Braucu ar: E34
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08 Oct 2024, 20:36:48 @user rakstīja:
Jaunais NATO ģenerālsekretārs: Nākamā ziema Ukrainai varētu būt smagākā kopš lielā kara sākuma
Lasìju virsrakstu, atveru rakstu ar domu palasìt ko Karins saka.. a tur kaut kads lohs. Vai tad Karinam tur nebija jabut
Tev pārmetīs, ka esi lohs vai pieduries 
Kariņa čomi saka, ka šis būs labāks par Stoltenbergu 'dēļ notriektās pasažieru lidmašīnas | | Offline | | |
| DiksIrseejs | | 08. Oct 2024, 22:41 |
#9806
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| Kopš: 08. Oct 2020
No: Dobele
Ziņojumi: 1438
Braucu ar: Hibrīdu
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08 Oct 2024, 20:36:48 @user rakstīja:
Jaunais NATO ģenerālsekretārs: Nākamā ziema Ukrainai varētu būt smagākā kopš lielā kara sākuma
Lasìju virsrakstu, atveru rakstu ar domu palasìt ko Karins saka.. a tur kaut kads lohs. Vai tad Karinam tur nebija jabut
NATO nevarēja atļauties Kariņu algot. | | Offline | | |
| Lafter | | 09. Oct 2024, 00:26 |
#9807
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| Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| Rheinmetall is supplying qualification rounds of a new generation of tank ammunition for a joint qualification of the Bundeswehr and the British Army
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| Lafter | | 09. Oct 2024, 16:56 |
#9808
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| Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| Izskatās- ir saņēmušies
Polija uzskāk K2PL ražošanu. Viņiem bija problēmas ar licenzes iegūšanu kopā ar tehnoloģijām. Taču izskatās ir atrisinājuši.
Briti - Challenger-3
Links
Franči pretdronu moduļus jau.
Links
Un Ūdens dronus
Jenķi jaunas lidmašīnas flotei
Navy Making Final Selection For F/A-XX Stealth Fighter, Plans For 2030s Service Entry
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| Lafter | | 10. Oct 2024, 01:34 |
#9809
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| Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| Grāmata 32 zaļie. 15tajā izsūtīs. Gaidu ar nepacietîbu
Leģendārs žurnàlists.
Inside Biden’s ‘War’ Room: Heads of State and Heads of Hair Bob Woodward doesn’t know which story he wants to tell in his latest presidential chronicle.
It’s not listed among the enumerated powers of the American presidency, but one of the modern expectations of the office is that Bob Woodward will write at least one book about your administration. Over the past 30 years Bill Clinton and Barack Obama have earned two apiece, while the presidencies of George W. Bush and Donald J. Trump each fill out a trilogy.
As senator and vice president, Joe Biden was a supporting player in many of those books and the full-fledged co-star of “Peril,” the last Trump volume, which Woodward wrote with Robert Costa and which covered the 2020 election and the Jan. 6 riot at the Capitol. Now, with “War,” Biden has a chronicle of his own. It’s a strange, self-divided book — more admiring of its subject than most of its predecessors and less confident in its own narrative, busy with incident and yet weirdly detached from the chaos of the world as we know it.
The presidency, a famously lonely office, is in Woodward’s presentation anything but solitary. Surrounding the commander in chief in each book are cabinet officers, aides and advisers. Some of them are Woodward’s sources, though he doesn’t say which. His method, explained in a note at the end of “War,” is to conduct his interviews “under the journalist ground rule of ‘deep background,’” meaning “that all the information could be used but I would not say who provided it.”
“At the center of good governance,” Woodward writes, is “teamwork,” and the reader spends a fair amount of time with members of Biden’s national security team, including Lloyd Austin and Antony Blinken, the secretaries of defense and state; Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser and Vice President Kamala Harris.
They and their colleagues and underlings give the narrative a bustling, procedural efficiency. Woodward limns them in barbershop prose: “Biden’s chief of staff, Ron Klain, 59, with dark brown hair and a friendly, high-charging demeanor”; Blinken, “5-foot-10 with a neat wave of once brown, now gray, hair.” If this were a movie, these people would be played by solid second-tier character actors.
Mostly, though, Biden shares the stage with other heads of state. Their hairstyles are a matter of public record. The tonsorially distinguished Boris Johnson, for example, is described simply as “a member of the British Conservative Party and a product of prestigious Eton and Oxford.” “Prestigious” in that sentence is a nugget of pure Woodwardian gold.
But the main global heavyweights with whom Biden and Woodward must contend are Vladimir Putin, Benjamin Netanyahu and, above all, Trump.
“War” opens with Trump in 1989, a 42-year-old wheeler-dealer sitting down to chat with Woodward and his Watergate reporting partner, Carl Bernstein. A transcript of that interview, unearthed in 2023, reveals, according to Woodward, “the origin of Trumpism in the words of Trump himself.” Then as now, “Trump’s character was focused on winning, fighting and surviving.”
And, he might have added, on claiming the center of attention. In a book determined to focus on Biden-era diplomacy, the story of Trump’s latest presidential run is a subplot that keeps threatening to turn into the main event.
Many of the headlines that “War” has generated have focused on its claims that Trump, as president, sent Covid tests to Putin and, after leaving office, had several phone conversations with the Russian president. But the real news that Woodward wants to make is about how Biden dealt with Putin before and after the invasion of Ukraine and with Netanyahu in the wake of the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks; and about how the president, as Sullivan puts it, “kept the homeland safe” through a tumultuous three and a half years.
The action stretches from early 2021 to this past summer — from the hectic weeks before Biden’s inauguration to the swirling aftermath of his withdrawal from the 2024 campaign. Not that “War” is primarily about electoral politics. (Tim Walz is mentioned once, JD Vance not at all.) Nor is it about the issues that polls suggest matter most to voters. There’s a brief chapter on immigration, a couple of references to inflation and nothing much about abortion, crime or climate change. The judicial branch of government goes all but unmentioned; the legislative branch consists mainly of Senator Lindsey Graham, seen largely in the role of Trump’s golf partner.
Woodward isn’t interested in partisanship or ideology. His subject is high statecraft, the exercise of power at its loftiest reaches, which mostly involves heads of government and their lieutenants talking — and frequently swearing — on the telephone. Leadership is a matter of personality, and a leader’s temperament is tested above all in the arena of foreign policy. In “War,” Biden’s presidency is defined — at times threatened and, in Woodward’s frankly stated opinion, ultimately vindicated — by how he handles Ukraine and the Middle East.
In the case of Ukraine, after “an astonishing intelligence coup from the crown jewels of U.S. intelligence” revealed Putin’s war plan, the administration had to convince its allies — and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky — of the gravity of the threat. Once the Russian troops were moving toward Kyiv, the tasks were to bolster Ukraine militarily and diplomatically while avoiding the direct involvement of NATO or U.S. forces and heading off the threat of a potential nuclear escalation.
This is harrowing, riveting stuff, even if you know how it will play out. The problem, though, is that we don’t really know. Since the book’s completion, Russia has been on the offensive again in Ukraine. The Middle East conflict has widened to include Hezbollah and Iran, an outcome that Biden and his team spend many pages working to prevent. Meanwhile, the election campaigns of Trump and Harris hurtle forward. Three weeks after “War” is published on Oct. 15, voters will provide raw material for the sequel.
Though he specializes in real-time suspense, Woodward doesn’t write cliffhangers. His impulse — his talent — is to impose an arc and a moral on the mess and sprawl of very recent history. This time around, his stated conclusions are unambiguous: “Donald Trump is not only the wrong man for the presidency,” he writes, “he is unfit to lead the country.” In contrast, “Biden and his team will be largely studied in history as an example of steady and purposeful leadership.” Those judgments sound authoritative. They also sound wishful.
WAR | By Bob Woodward | Simon & Schuster | 435 pp. | $32
A.O. Scott is a critic at large for The Times’s Book Review, writing about literature and ideas. He joined The Times in 2000 and was a film critic until early 2023. More about A.O. Scott
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| Lafter | | 10. Oct 2024, 01:43 |
#9810
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| Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| FT versija
Donald Trump spoke to Vladimir Putin several times after he left the White House, book says Bob Woodward says former US president also secretly sent Covid-19 tests to Russian leader
Donald Trump had as many as seven conversations with Vladimir Putin after he left the White House, according to explosive reports that raise fresh questions about the former US president’s relationship with the Russian leader.
The claims stem from a forthcoming book by veteran journalist Bob Woodward, due to be published next week. The Washington Post, his longtime employer, first reported on the book’s contents.
Woodward’s book also reveals Trump secretly sent Putin Covid-19 tests for his personal use at the height of the pandemic, the report said.
The book, War, reportedly describes a scene earlier this year, when Trump told an aide to leave his Mar-a-Lago office so he could speak privately by phone with Putin. The unnamed aide cited in the book suggested the former president and Russia’s leader had spoken as many as seven times since Trump left the White House in 2021.
The reports raise new questions about Trump’s relationship with Putin with less than a month to go until the US presidential election.
Trump, the Republican candidate, trails his Democratic opponent, Kamala Harris, by more than three points, according to the Financial Times poll tracker, although they are locked in a virtual tie in all seven swing states that will determine who wins November’s vote.
A spokesperson for Simon & Schuster, Woodward’s publisher, did not respond to a request for comment.
The Trump campaign’s communications director Steven Cheung rejected the reports and launched a personal attack on Woodward, calling him a “truly demented and deranged man”.
Cheung said Trump gave Woodward “absolutely no access for this trash book”, adding: “Woodward is a total sleazebag who has lost it mentally.”
Trump’s running mate JD Vance called Woodward a “hack” and defended the former president at a campaign stop in Michigan on Tuesday.
“Have I talked to Donald Trump about his calls with Vladimir Putin? No. I’ve never had that conversation with Donald Trump in my life,” Vance said in response to a reporter’s question. “Even if it is true, is there something wrong with speaking to world leaders? Is there anything wrong with engaging in diplomacy?”
But Harris told radio personality Howard Stern in an interview on Tuesday that the reports demonstrated “who Trump is”.
“People in America were struggling to get tests and this guy is sending them to Russia, to a murderous dictator for his personal use?” she said.
“That is just the most recent stark example of who Trump is. He secretly sent Covid test kits for the personal use of Putin of Russia, an adversary to the United States, when he was talking about Americans should be putting bleach in their blood.”
Woodward, 81, became famous in the 1970s when he and fellow Washington Post reporter Carl Bernstein broke stories about the Watergate scandal, which led to then president Richard Nixon’s resignation. He has written more than a dozen bestselling books, including four volumes on the Trump presidency.
Trump has sued Woodward over a 2022 audiobook based on 20 interviews that he conducted with the former president between 2016 and 2020. Trump has argued that publishing the tapes violates his copyright, while Simon & Schuster has repeatedly filed motions to dismiss the case.
Trump’s possible return to the White House could have significant implications for Russia, Ukraine and the Nato alliance. The former president — who called Putin a “genius” after Russia invaded Ukraine again in 2022 — has said he would end the fighting in Ukraine on “day one” if he is re-elected, but has not detailed how he would do so. In last month’s presidential debate, Trump declined to say that he wanted Ukraine to win the war.
Harris has accused Trump of pandering to Putin and told CBS News in an interview that aired on Monday night that she would not meet “bilaterally” with the Russian president unless his Ukrainian counterparts were offered a seat at the negotiating table.
Lauren Fedor in Washington OCTOBER 8 2024[ Šo ziņu laboja Lafter, 10 Oct 2024, 01:44:26 ]
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| kkas | | 10. Oct 2024, 09:01 |
#9811
|
|  Kopš: 22. Apr 2008
Ziņojumi: 10209
Braucu ar: Alfu
| trampam ļoti patīk diktatori un autoritāras personas. pats apvērsumu mēģināja veikt. tā kā viss loģiski. | | Offline | | |
| Lafter | | 10. Oct 2024, 10:58 |
#9812
|
| Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| Publikacijās ir uzsvars uz Trump. Bet pa lielam, tur ir par ko citu pēc būtības. Par aizkulišu spēlîtēm. Par pentagona zvanu vatei- izrādās šie reāli gribēja ar taktisko iemaukt. Kad USA norāva mērci tā, pa nopietno. Utt, utjp.
400 lapas ar interesantu lasāmvielu.
Tas čalis bija viens no tiem, kurš savulaik nonesa USA prezidentu. Un esmu pārliecināts, kad 90+% tur ir patiesība.
Par Trump ir cita- FEAR.  [ Šo ziņu laboja Lafter, 10 Oct 2024, 11:05:04 ]
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| bum_bumz | | 10. Oct 2024, 16:22 |
#9813
|
| Kopš: 05. Jan 2006
Ziņojumi: 7446
Braucu ar: E34
| Ārpus USA medijiem Trampa bubulis ir noplacis, kā būs būs. Nevar saprast, Kamala kandidē vai Teilore. Otrā aizsūtīja 5 mio no Miltona cietušajiem, kad virpulis vēl atradās virs Meksikas līča un nebija sasniedzis Tampu  | | Offline | | |
| Lafter | | 10. Oct 2024, 18:47 |
#9814
|
| Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
|
10 Oct 2024, 17:01:26 @Elviss rakstīja:
10 Oct 2024, 10:58:50 @Lafter rakstīja:
Publikacijās ir uzsvars uz Trump. Bet pa lielam, tur ir par ko citu pēc būtības. Par aizkulišu spēlîtēm. Par pentagona zvanu vatei- izrādās šie reāli gribēja ar taktisko iemaukt. Kad USA norāva mērci tā, pa nopietno. Utt, utjp.
400 lapas ar interesantu lasāmvielu.
Tas čalis bija viens no tiem, kurš savulaik nonesa USA prezidentu. Un esmu pārliecināts, kad 90+% tur ir patiesība.
Par Trump ir cita- FEAR.
Gan jau esi visas arī izlasījis
Bet, jo tad blato, ka nonesīs visu floti, ja uzmetis taktisko.
Arī sanāk mīzēji un dirsēji.
Visas nē..
Gaidu pēdējo- vēl 5 dienas. Kas jau ir kopsavilkums.
Bet jā- mītu ir daudz par neuzvaramo USA kura nemīž. Un kuriem analogof ñet…
Patīk, vai nē- bet fakts.
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| Lafter | | 10. Oct 2024, 22:31 |
#9815
|
| Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| Pšeki izskatās gatavi kauties par visiem 
Es friču vietā sāktu aizdomāties  
Poland to Become Europe's Most Powerful in Attack Helicopters with US Apache AH-64
Poland Builds Europe’s Largest Mobile Artillery Forces with Record K9 Howitzers Acquisitions
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elbruss  | | 10. Oct 2024, 22:50 |
#9816
|
|  Kopš: 12. May 2006
Ziņojumi: 1159
Braucu ar: BMW, Škoda, velo, slēpes
| Ja paskatās vēsturi, tad poļi vairākus simtus gadu ir tikuši malti starp lielvaru dzirnakmeņiem. Viņiem ir ļoti skarba vēsture. Tagad ir izaugusi jauna paaudze pilnīgi neatkarīgā Polijā, kas apzinās savu identitāti un saprot, ka vienīgais veids kā neļaut darīt pāri, ir pašiem kļūt stipriem. Viņi šobrīd kā tauta ir diezgan vienoti šajā savā mērķī, tāpēc es nebrīnos par pēdējo 5-8 gadu viņu ambiciozajiem militārajiem plāniem/darbiem.
Es domāju, ka poļi, zviedri un somi būs tie kas spēs pastāvēt par sevi. Uz pārējo eiropu lielas cerības neliktu, jo tur nav vienotības sabiedrībā. | | Offline | | |
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| viagris | | 10. Oct 2024, 22:55 |
#9817
|
|  Kopš: 06. Jul 2004
Ziņojumi: 4772
Braucu ar:
| 250 mpv droni un tie helīši ir milzu kaudze ar metāllūžniem, vēl neviens nav sapratis, ka jābliež miljonu dronu armija, nevis jābalsta pindosi ar naudu, jo, ja sāksies karš, pindosi pateiks kuj raķetes drīkstat izmantot vai vnk nepārdos stāvēs tie un rūsēs kā efkas Ukrainā.. | | Offline | | |
| Lafter | | 10. Oct 2024, 23:10 |
#9818
|
| Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
|
10 Oct 2024, 22:55:21 @viagris rakstīja:
250 mpv droni un tie helīši ir milzu kaudze ar metāllūžniem, vēl neviens nav sapratis, ka jābliež miljonu dronu armija, nevis jābalsta pindosi ar naudu, jo, ja sāksies karš, pindosi pateiks kuj raķetes drīkstat izmantot vai vnk nepārdos stāvēs tie un rūsēs kā efkas Ukrainā..
Viņiem jau ir braucošas mīnas, droni, rebi…
Tur viñi neatpaliek ne, par matu…
Pšeki reāli uzvilkušies.
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| RolandsK | | 10. Oct 2024, 23:17 |
#9819
|
|  Kopš: 06. Sep 2006
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 3645
Braucu ar: ᴑᴑ un Zaļo Briesmoni
| Poļi izskatās, ka nemīzīs, ja vajadzēs dot mizā. | | Offline | | |
| Samsasi | | 10. Oct 2024, 23:20 |
#9820
|
|  Kopš: 01. Nov 2014
Ziņojumi: 5530
Braucu ar:
| Vacieši aizņemti ar savu stulbumu | | Offline | | |
|
Moderatori: 968-jk, AV, AiwaShuraLLP, BigArchi, GirtzB, Lafter, PERFS, RVR, R_BERGS, SteelRat, VLD, linda, mrc, noisex, smudo
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