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Tēma: Notikumi UkraināZiedot Ukrainas armijas atbalstam var uz Ukrainas Nacionālās bankas speciāli izveidoto kontu
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| kkas | |  Kopš: 22. Apr 2008
Ziņojumi: 9399
Braucu ar: Alfu
| kapičam vai kam tur patika par biezpienu un biezpiemaizēm runāt = tiršanai.
nu tur rietumu 1 miljons lādiņi, utml.
Eiropai točna nav ko iedot un uzražot. kā 2pk laikā Vācija, krievi varētu aizskriet līdz tuvākajai reālai kodolvalstij (Francija sanāk) eiropā bez īpašām problēmām. Ja ASV neiejauktos ātrāk. |  Offline | | |
Lafter  | |  Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| Viss. Iedos tālas darbības munīciju.
Bet uzbrukumi dziļi krievijas teritorijā, pa lidlaukiem utt. Stingri aizliegti.
Kāds man muļķim var paskaidrot- kàda jēga dot munîciju pieņemsim uz 1000km, ja vari izmantot tikai- 300km attàlumà. Nu tèlaini izsakoties. Tad dod tuvākas darbības, bet jaudīgākus. Kuri arī maksà lētàk..
Loģiski spriežot..
Tas ir kà uzsaukt čalim mauku un pateikt. Re! Dari ar viņu ko gribi!
P.s
Skūpstīt var, glāstīt var. Pist nedrīkst. Bet par visu ir samaksàts 
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| Arsm3ns | |  Kopš: 27. Oct 2023
Ziņojumi: 928
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| Kāpēc, lai tās nebūtu M.Stārastes pasakas, lai mums būtu ko ik dienu 'ziņās' lasīt un te sašust, te priecāties 
Kāpēc lai šie publiski kaut kādiem interneta lošpehiem, katru dienu atskaitītos par to, ko reāli darīs, ja karš ir visu laiku par pretējās puses pārsteigšanu.
Kā stāsts par Gorbočovu, kurš ar ienaidnieka pusi smiedamies lok viskiju, visu sadīlojis, sadalījis, bet visas nāācijas dreb vai kuru katru stundu kodolkarš nesāksies un skrien pēc rīta avīzes uz kiosku.
Paskaties ko paši te atkarībā no šīs dienas ziņām, vai nu kravājat koferi un saldējat zivis vai - haha, tulīt vate agonijā vārtīsies izputējusi un sakauta  | | Offline | | |
| Lafter | | Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| Atbilde vienkàrša.
1)Ja tās bûtu pasakas- spràgtu sen jau daudz un pamatīgi. Tālu krievijà. Fakts???? - fakts dotajà brīdī.
2) Ja tād būtu pasakas, tad Ukraiñiem nebūtu munîcijas limitu utt.
Fakts? - fakts dotajà brîdî.
3) Ja tàs nebūtu pasakas, vate normāli nemauktu uz priekšu. Fakts? - fakts dotajā brîdī.
Viñi tur var rakstīt, teikt ko vēlas. Fakti runà par sevi dotajā brīdî.
Un tā varu turpinàt minūtes 15.
Tik vienkàrši.
Tāpat, kà pasakas par lendlīzi, visàdàm palīdzības pakàm utt. Tikai apakšà ar maziem burtiņiem- piegàdes paredzētas 2026/2027 gadā. Varbūt viņas vairs tad nevajadzēs…
Par ko tieši šaubas? [ Šo ziņu laboja Lafter, 26 Sep 2024, 16:33:14 ]
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| Indo | |  Kopš: 18. May 2002
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 5152
Braucu ar: Husky FC450 '15, CBF1000 '08, KTM Ark Minarelli 2T un lodāmuru pa plati
| SUŅU BŪDA V2.0 / Bijušais Saeimas deputāts, tagad latviešu kareivis Ukrainā - Sandis Riekstiņš, kurš nekaro par Ukrainu, bet Ukrainā aizsargā Latviju. | | Offline | | |
| Lafter | | Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| As Russian forces continue their advance in the Pokrovsk front, long-standing systemic issues within the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to aid Russians with that. Based on numerous conversations with sergeants, as well as junior, and senior officers in command positions in the Donbas region, I am writing this post the goal of highlighting the most common and consistent problems mentioned by people on the ground, per their request. Unfortunately, the higher command remains largely unresponsive to these concerns when raised internally.
1. Disconnect in Command and Combat Readiness
There is an apparent disconnect between higher command assessment and the actual combat readiness of units. In many cases, units with limited operational capacity are tasked with responsibilities far beyond their capabilities. For example, newly formed brigades with little battlefield experience are assigned to defend critical and high-risk areas of the frontline, where Russian forces have massed sufficient strength for a potential breakthrough. At the same time, more experienced and better-equipped brigades are stationed in less dangerous sectors.
This imbalance has allowed Russian forces to pinpoint weak spots along the frontline and exploit them, especially during unit rotations - something that they can track easily due to their ISR capabilities. The Ukrainian command, in turn, often scrambles to reallocate battalions from other areas to stabilize vulnerable areas that appeared from miscalculations.
While such actions can help to stabilize the line and even prevent a breakthrough, it leaves other parts of the frontline exposed, perpetuating a cycle of vulnerability.
For context, what may appear to higher-ups as “a company with 60% of its personnel ready for deployment” may, in reality, be a fatigued unit with multiple soldiers in their 40s and 50s or people with previous injuries and chronic health problems, as well as newly arrived recruits with minimal training. The true combat readiness may be closer to 30-40%, but on paper, commanders see a combat-ready unit
2. The Lack of Truth and Realistic Reporting
The previously discussed disconnect raises the question: Why don’t officers report their unit’s inability to perform certain missions? The answer is simple: Brigade commanders and senior officers are ultimately responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of their units per regulations. Admitting that a unit cannot perform a task is often seen as a failure of brigade leadership. As a result, the command’s solution is simple: if a commander cannot ensure the unit’s readiness, someone else will be appointed to do so. But the situation with resources or combat readiness of unit doesn't improve - you just put a person who is going to push under-resourced and under-prepared units to complete a task they are not equipped to handle, leading to failed operations, abandoned positions, failed defenses, and unnecessary casualties - something that people can witness themselves by looking at the Deep State map.
3. Systematic Problems with Recruitment and Training
The quality and quantity of new recruits continue to fall short of expectations. Although some training centers have made improvements, overall readiness remains alarmingly insufficient. Many newly arrived soldiers are not prepared for the realities of frontline combat, forcing brigades to develop and implement their own internal training programs. The situation demands systemic reforms, including the creation of a structure that leverages the expertise of veterans or those recovering from injuries to train and mentor incoming recruits.
4. Little to no Accountability
Three years into the war, Ukraine has yet to fully implement an After Action Review (AAR) process, which hasn't been implemented except in cases where individual officers took the initiative. The tactical level is the highest level where it's used.
The blame for operational failures often falls on mid-level officers, and in some cases, even soldiers on the ground.
Even in rare cases, after public scandals, when generals are removed from their posts following catastrophic failures, they are typically reassigned to other command positions rather than being held accountable, leaving little room for new, younger, and more innovative officers to rise through the ranks.
This inability to change with essentially a petrified soviet hierarchy within Ukraine’s military leadership continues to generate previously mentioned problems.
Epilogue
Ultimately, these problems are rooted in systemic failures at the top. Poor decision-making, inefficient resource allocation, inadequate recruitment and training programs, and a fundamental lack of understanding of the conditions on the ground continue to plague the AFU. These are not the failures of soldiers or officers who are risking their lives daily on the ground, and who are frequently blamed by command for failures. These are the consequences of people incapable of either admitting the problem or building a plan to address these problems.
The toll of these problems is paid by those on the frontlines, who sacrifice their lives and health to protect their families and their country.
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| Lafter | | Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
| President Zelensky is seeking security guarantees as part of Ukraine's ongoing effort to join NATO. While few expect this request to result in a positive answer, the reality is that Ukraine urgently needs security assurances to end the war and ensure its survival. This isn’t mere rhetoric to grab your attention - it’s an invitation to an honest discussion about why Zelensky is pushing for a new security framework - and why it must be taken seriously.
Some of these points may echo earlier discussions, but they need to be repeated to understand the full picture. No matter how optimistic some portray the situation, or talk about great Ukraine after the victory, it doesn't resolve the problem. Admitting the problem and discussing it is the first step to a solution.
Let’s take a hard look at the potential consequences if Ukraine freezes the conflict without securing firm guarantees.
First, consider the economic and demographic problems of post-war Ukraine. The country has lost ~18% of its territory, including important agricultural and industrial regions in the south and east. Even in areas under Ukrainian control near the frontline, land remains unsafe due to extensive minefields. Sea ports like Mariupol and Berdyansk are occupied, and large industrial facilities, akin to Azovstal are destroyed.
Demographically, the situation is even worse. Before the war, Ukraine already faced one of the worst population trends in Europe. The Ptoukha Institute for Demography estimates that only around 29 million people lived in government-controlled areas at the start of 2024 - which is down from 45 million before the 2014 Russian invasion and Crimea’s annexation.
The war has accelerated the exodus of younger Ukrainians, particularly women and children, leaving behind an aging population. Adding to this, hundreds of thousands of veterans will return home, many of whom will require physical and psychological support. Managing this social, economic, and political burden without security guarantees would be a monumental task for any state forced to have high military spending, let alone Ukraine, with GDP per capita almost 5 times less than Greece. Additionally, without firm security guarantees and a concrete long-term plan, the likelihood of people returning from abroad remains slim.
Lack of guarantees will multiply the factor of instability, with fears of another Russian invasion driving more citizens to flee once borders fully reopen. The resulting uncertainty would deter post-war investments, as high-security risks and social instability would create an unattractive environment for any serious economic engagement.
Politically, Ukraine will also enter a period of uncertainty and risks. While Zelensky remains a unifying figure in wartime, internal tensions, which are often invisible to the Western audience are mounting, creating an increasingly toxic political atmosphere. A stalled war, millions displaced, lost territories, and a crippled economy hardly set the stage for calm and easy elections. As Ukraine enters a period of intense political competition, accusations of military failures are likely to dominate the discourse. It will be a test of Ukraine’s ability to preserve national unity across political lines.
Some argue that immigration could help address the problem, but what exactly would draw immigrants to Ukraine, where the average monthly salary is between $500 and $700, in a country ravaged by post-war problems and facing the constant threat of another Russian invasion? Especially when far more attractive opportunities are available within the EU.
Many Western partners assure Ukraine that aid will ensure that it won't happen, but how reliable are these statements, given the history of similar statements akin to "Will support Ukraine as long as it takes" in today’s realities? Democracies operate on election cycles, and promises of long-term support can quickly become an object of shifting political winds.
As elections approach, Ukraine could find itself a target of political debate, with opposition asking why their nations should prioritize foreign aid over pressing domestic issues like healthcare, education, or economic problems. In such an environment, the commitment to Ukraine is unstable and can't be trusted.
The same applies to military aid for Ukraine. While Russia will keep rebuilding its forces, Ukraine will primarily depend on its own, much smaller domestic production and increasingly uncertain Western support, which will use peace as an excuse to diminish its aid
Russia, despite facing similar challenges, holds a significant advantage by being larger in most metrics, allowing it to better absorb these problems. Its vast resources, particularly oil and gas, offer economic leverage to soften the post-war problems. Moreover, Russia is likely to see some sanctions bypassed thanks to inconsistent enforcement. Under these conditions, it may only be a matter of time before Russia rebuilds a force large enough to deliver a decisive blow to Ukraine. Meanwhile, democratic Ukraine, without solid security guarantees, faces a far bleaker scenario.
Current peace proposals essentially send the same message: no guarantees for Ukraine, but a demand to cede territory and abandon aspirations of joining the Western alliance. In other words, nearly 30 million people are being sacrificed because the West is too weak and unwilling to make bold, risky decisions that could shape a better future..
——/
A grim but insightful article in the FT discusses acute manpower shortages on the frontlines and inadequate training.
While it quotes Ukrainian officials citing 30,000 recruits per month, after reading the article, you might get feeling as though Ukraine is struggling to get any recruits. One of the reasons is that after completing training, new recruits are often assigned to newly formed brigades, even if they had a reference from another unit that recruited them. As a result, experienced brigades like the 72nd, now heavily engaged in Vuhledar and fighting since day one, are losing their veteran core without properly passing experience to fresh recruits, as most are directed to new units.
In short, the problem isn’t a lack of willing Ukrainians, recruitment numbers are up, but rather a bizarre management decision on top
Article: https://www.ft.com/content/b9396112-585a-4f7e-9628-13d500c99d93
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| Lafter | | Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
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| Skarbā un neizprotamā patiesība..
Un NEKO!!! Nemaina jau … gadu man šķiet?? Spîtīgi turpina graut ticību, mest cilvēkus garantētà nāvē. Nu jau pašu virsnieki un tie kuri palīdz błauj.
Pajāt 
Vakar nogalinājām 3000 krievus, aizvakar 7000- rīt iespējams 9000. Karš tūliņ beigsies un dzīve būs šokolādē 
Ir vēl vairāk- liela daļa ,,mobilizēto,, sarakstos ir iemainīti, var teikt ietirgoti pret visādiem uz ielas noķertiem indivīdiem ar hroniskām slimībām un ekstravagantu dzīves veidu. Ja pieņemsis @lafter saņem pavēsti. Bet @lafter dzīve ir šokolādē. @lafter iet pie cilvēka un saka. Klau- man dzīve šokolādē, redz barsetka ar piķi. Labs auto. Pats jauns- viss ok. Ko darīt?
Nu ko darīt atbild cilvēks smaidot un pakasa galvu. Barsetka tiek atvērta un pēc laiciņa uz ielas kur zem krūma tiek savākts sabiedribai nederīgāks elements. Viņš pat iespējams nav derīgs militārajam dienestam. Taču vajag tikai aizvietot personu ar ,,barsetku,,
Elements ahujā pamostas no pohas jau rekrutēšanas centra pagalmā. Kur viņam tiek ,,mīļi,, paskaidrots- tagad Tu būsi paraug karavīrs un Tev ir izkritusi brīnišķīgā loze- aizstāvēt dzimteni un krist, kā varonim. Lai uzlabotu elementa omu un pastiprinātu mīlestību pret dzimteni- viņam tiek iestādīti pāris precīzi sitieni pa kunģi. Un terapija turpinās, līdz rekrutētāji paliek apmierināti ar elementa mīlestību pret dzimteni.
Elements pakasa pauri un domà- jūs ko čaļi! Kad ir izvedība, iemet granàtu virsnieku blindàžà un ar domubiedriem aizbrien pie vates.
Vai labākajā gadījumā, nomet visu ekipējumu un aiziet prom.
Stāsts nosapņots zem coldrex karsto dzērienu izraisîtajām blaknèm. Piefiksēju , kamēr sapnis nav aizmirsts.[ Šo ziņu laboja Lafter, 29 Sep 2024, 14:49:00 ]
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| Samsasi | |  Kopš: 01. Nov 2014
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| Nu kā saka hujovā realitāte. Par kuru neviens nerunā un visi izliekas, ka tādas nav. Peremoga un zradņiki | | Offline | | |
ixers  | |  Kopš: 29. Jul 2004
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26 Sep 2024, 16:06:55 @Lafter rakstīja:
Viss. Iedos tālas darbības munīciju.
Bet uzbrukumi dziļi krievijas teritorijā, pa lidlaukiem utt. Stingri aizliegti.
Kāds man muļķim var paskaidrot- kàda jēga dot munîciju pieņemsim uz 1000km, ja vari izmantot tikai- 300km attàlumà. Nu tèlaini izsakoties. Tad dod tuvākas darbības, bet jaudīgākus. Kuri arī maksà lētàk..
Loģiski spriežot..
Tas ir kà uzsaukt čalim mauku un pateikt. Re! Dari ar viņu ko gribi!
P.s
Skūpstīt var, glāstīt var. Pist nedrīkst. Bet par visu ir samaksàts
Labi, viņu pašu mil ražošana arī kaut ko dod ārā. Uzbūvēs savus mopēdusun aizsūtīs līdz čukotkai. | | Offline | | |
RSAWorkshop  | |  Kopš: 13. Dec 2014
No: Rīga
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| Ieguvumi viennomīzīgi būs, jo cilvēces progresu uz priekšu dzen vispirms karš un pēc tam slinkums
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RSAWorkshop-BMW remonts un apkope
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| Lafter | | Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
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| Arty Green atvałinājumā.
Beidzot intevija.
Intervija Politekai. 10 minūtes pirmās nekas tāds. Un tālāk jau aiziet vārdi, uzvàrdi. Kas patiesībā notika kad Zalužnijs bija, kas tagad.
Izskatās, kad ne tikai vatastānā sāk mutuļot…
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| Lafter | | Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
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| Arī tā var noveikties 
Tīzeris no k-2 bataljona komandiera intervijas.Zelenskim- Dirst nav līķu maisus nest.. te arī izskatās sprāgs àrà vārdi un uzvārdi..
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| Lafter | | Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
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| Tikmēr Ukrainā!
Žīdi sāk ierasties uz svētkiem. Varēja vate nedaudz uzgrabināt. Bet tā lai necieš cilvēki.  Netanjahu ,,ievērtētu,, 10000%
Taču domāju- tur ir safe vieta tagad.
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| user | | Kopš: 12. May 2020
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01 Oct 2024, 11:54:15 @Lafter rakstīja:
Tikmēr Ukrainā!
Žīdi sāk ierasties uz svētkiem. Varēja vate nedaudz uzgrabināt. Bet tā lai necieš cilvēki. Netanjahu ,,ievērtētu,, 10000%
Taču domāju- tur ir safe vieta tagad.
Kas ta par huinu? | | Offline | | |
| Lafter | | Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
Braucu ar: wv
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01 Oct 2024, 12:37:10 @user rakstīja:
01 Oct 2024, 11:54:15 @Lafter rakstīja:
Tikmēr Ukrainā!
Žīdi sāk ierasties uz svētkiem. Varēja vate nedaudz uzgrabināt. Bet tā lai necieš cilvēki. Netanjahu ,,ievērtētu,, 10000%
Taču domāju- tur ir safe vieta tagad.
Kas ta par huinu?
Hasīta svētceļnieki svin jūdaisma jauno gadu. Parasti ap 30k danco. Gari jàraksta, kāpēc un kāpēc tieši Ukrainā.
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| Lafter | | Kopš: 23. Sep 2007
Ziņojumi: 28686
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| Vuhledara kritusi.
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| Indo | | Kopš: 18. May 2002
No: Rīga
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| Putina jaunais ierocis Ukrainā: Krievija uz fronti sākusi sūtīt vilkus. Kā šie plēsēji var palīdzēt okupantiem?
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| abyss | |  Kopš: 26. Jun 2013
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| https://censor.net/en/photo_news/3495335/zagynu...lentyn_korenchuk
Papildināt info arī par Kijevas spoku | | Offline | | |
| user | | Kopš: 12. May 2020
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01 Oct 2024, 14:14:09 @Lafter rakstīja:
Vuhledara kritusi.
Un kas ar to 72 brigadi? | | Offline | | |
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Moderatori: 968-jk, AV, BigArchi, BlackMagicWoman, Czars, GirtzB, Lafter, PERFS, RVR, SteelRat, VLD, kolhozs, linda, mrc, noisex, smudo
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