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Pašreiz BMWPower skatās 239 viesi un 0 reģistrēti lietotāji.
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Tēma: Bankas
| Autors | Ziņojums |
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crime  | | 18. Jan 2018, 17:39 |
#2421
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|  Kopš: 03. Jul 2008
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 8517
Braucu ar: m635csi
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18 Jan 2018, 13:50:27 @zzips rakstīja:
18 Jan 2018, 13:41:17 @crime rakstīja:
18 Jan 2018, 12:56:49 @Tune-L rakstīja:
Kādam ir konts un maksājumu karte Paysera?
Kādas atsauksmes?
Cik noprotu, tad VID tur vēl nevar iebāzt savu smirdīgo šņukuru un no LV bankām var pa tieši iepūst naļiku Paysera kontā?
Tur viss čotka, tikai no swed uz paysera maksājumi iet ilgāk, hz kapec tā, uz/no seb nāk apmēram 2-3 stundu laikā, no swed nākamajā dienā. Naļiku gan vairāk par 600€ diennaktī nenoņemsi. Paysera ir savs swift, tas ir reāls bankas konts, nav nekāds tipa paypal, emaksājums vai cita figņa
Paysera ir macinņš iekšējais konts tik pēc IBANa izskatās 
iekšējais konts ir šāds EVP72100030XXXXX
bet tev ir arī normāls iban - LT8935000100030XXXXX |  Offline | | |
RVR  | | 13. Feb 2018, 17:51 |
#2422
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|  Kopš: 18. Sep 2008
Ziņojumi: 22291
Braucu ar: RVR
| Cik negaidīti, vai ne? 
Links
| | Offline | | |
| zulus | | 13. Feb 2018, 21:05 |
#2423
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|  Kopš: 18. Aug 2006
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 3328
Braucu ar:
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13 Feb 2018, 17:51:16 @RVR rakstīja:
Cik negaidīti, vai ne?
Links
Negaidītāka ir FKTK totāla impotence un pohujisms.
[ Šo ziņu laboja zulus, 13 Feb 2018, 21:05:34 ] | | Offline | | |
| elbruss | | 13. Feb 2018, 21:56 |
#2424
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|  Kopš: 12. May 2006
Ziņojumi: 1004
Braucu ar: BMW, Škoda, velo, slēpes
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13 Feb 2018, 21:05:09 @zulus rakstīja:
Negaidītāka ir FKTK totāla impotence un pohujisms.
Tieši FKTK impotence ir tas par ko neviens Latvijas finanšu sfērā strādājošais vairs nešaubās jau daudzus gadus. Un tas nav tikai banku dēļ. | | Offline | | |
| zulus | | 13. Feb 2018, 22:20 |
#2425
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| Kopš: 18. Aug 2006
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 3328
Braucu ar:
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13 Feb 2018, 21:56:15 @elbruss rakstīja:
13 Feb 2018, 21:05:09 @zulus rakstīja:
Negaidītāka ir FKTK totāla impotence un pohujisms.
Tieši FKTK impotence ir tas par ko neviens Latvijas finanšu sfērā strādājošais vairs nešaubās jau daudzus gadus. Un tas nav tikai banku dēļ.
Tas bija sarkasms, tāpat kā RVR postā... FKTK un arī Kontroles dienests ar veco sažuvušo pediņu Burkānu priekšgalā, kam tiešā veidā būtu jau sen jāizpurina dažas finanšu iestādes ir vienkārši impotences kalngals, kas pat necenšas imitēt NEKĀDAS darbības, lai vismaz izliktos noderīgi... | | Offline | | |
| 968-jk | | 13. Feb 2018, 22:28 |
#2426
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|  Kopš: 08. Dec 2013
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 13618
Braucu ar: 30niekiem
| Nu, un pat ja tā būtu kā rakstīts, tad ko FKTK var izdarīt un kādas tam visam sekas? Vēl viena Krāpjbanka, Parex vai BB? | | Offline | | |
| Bron | | 13. Feb 2018, 23:31 |
#2427
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|  Kopš: 30. Aug 2002
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 15204
Braucu ar: Traktortehniku by Nissan
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18 Jan 2018, 13:50:27 @zzips rakstīja:
18 Jan 2018, 13:41:17 @crime rakstīja:
18 Jan 2018, 12:56:49 @Tune-L rakstīja:
Kādam ir konts un maksājumu karte Paysera?
Kādas atsauksmes?
Cik noprotu, tad VID tur vēl nevar iebāzt savu smirdīgo šņukuru un no LV bankām var pa tieši iepūst naļiku Paysera kontā?
Tur viss čotka, tikai no swed uz paysera maksājumi iet ilgāk, hz kapec tā, uz/no seb nāk apmēram 2-3 stundu laikā, no swed nākamajā dienā. Naļiku gan vairāk par 600€ diennaktī nenoņemsi. Paysera ir savs swift, tas ir reāls bankas konts, nav nekāds tipa paypal, emaksājums vai cita figņa
Paysera ir macinņš iekšējais konts tik pēc IBANa izskatās
PaySera ir normāla iestāde ar Lietuvas Centralās Bankas licenzi | | Offline | | |
| Mizx | | 13. Feb 2018, 23:38 |
#2428
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|  Kopš: 26. Apr 2004
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 6208
Braucu ar:
| Tas jau sāk izskatīties pēc vispārēja Latvijas Banku darba stila. Bija joks, ka visi Jūrmalas mēri ir agri vai vēlu ir sēdējuši. Izskatās, ka Latvijas banku vizītkarte arī ir naudas atmazgāšanas skandāli un valde / īpašnieki ar sodāmību. Atceroties vēl dažas sejas no šajā portālā populāras un bieži pieminētas parādu piedziņas firmas — Latvijā viss ir kārtībā! | | Offline | | |
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| zzips | | 14. Feb 2018, 10:19 |
#2429
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|  Kopš: 20. Feb 2004
Ziņojumi: 28219
Braucu ar: Slēgta tipa visurgājēju
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13 Feb 2018, 23:31:11 @Bron rakstīja:
18 Jan 2018, 13:50:27 @zzips rakstīja:
18 Jan 2018, 13:41:17 @crime rakstīja:
18 Jan 2018, 12:56:49 @Tune-L rakstīja:
Kādam ir konts un maksājumu karte Paysera?
Kādas atsauksmes?
Cik noprotu, tad VID tur vēl nevar iebāzt savu smirdīgo šņukuru un no LV bankām var pa tieši iepūst naļiku Paysera kontā?
Tur viss čotka, tikai no swed uz paysera maksājumi iet ilgāk, hz kapec tā, uz/no seb nāk apmēram 2-3 stundu laikā, no swed nākamajā dienā. Naļiku gan vairāk par 600€ diennaktī nenoņemsi. Paysera ir savs swift, tas ir reāls bankas konts, nav nekāds tipa paypal, emaksājums vai cita figņa
Paysera ir macinņš iekšējais konts tik pēc IBANa izskatās
PaySera ir normāla iestāde ar Lietuvas Centralās Bankas licenzi
Labi, maciņš ar licenzi un Sepu
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*Keep going..... It will all make sense soon | | Offline | | |
| V.I.P. | | 14. Feb 2018, 10:20 |
#2430
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|  Kopš: 18. May 2005
Ziņojumi: 17357
Braucu ar: AA numuriem [///M4, G wagon, GSX-R]
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13 Feb 2018, 21:58:39 @user rakstīja:
13 Feb 2018, 21:05:09 @zulus rakstīja:
13 Feb 2018, 17:51:16 @RVR rakstīja:
Cik negaidīti, vai ne?
Links
Negaidītāka ir FKTK totāla impotence un pohujisms.
Ko tu gribi lai vini dara?
varbuut lai njem mazaak kukulju un dara to, par ko vinjiem nodoklju maksaataaji maksaa algu.  [ Šo ziņu laboja V.I.P., 14 Feb 2018, 10:22:24 ] | | Offline | | |
| Bron | | 14. Feb 2018, 10:41 |
#2431
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| Kopš: 30. Aug 2002
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 15204
Braucu ar: Traktortehniku by Nissan
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14 Feb 2018, 10:19:01 @zzips rakstīja:
13 Feb 2018, 23:31:11 @Bron rakstīja:
18 Jan 2018, 13:50:27 @zzips rakstīja:
18 Jan 2018, 13:41:17 @crime rakstīja:
18 Jan 2018, 12:56:49 @Tune-L rakstīja:
Kādam ir konts un maksājumu karte Paysera?
Kādas atsauksmes?
Cik noprotu, tad VID tur vēl nevar iebāzt savu smirdīgo šņukuru un no LV bankām var pa tieši iepūst naļiku Paysera kontā?
Tur viss čotka, tikai no swed uz paysera maksājumi iet ilgāk, hz kapec tā, uz/no seb nāk apmēram 2-3 stundu laikā, no swed nākamajā dienā. Naļiku gan vairāk par 600€ diennaktī nenoņemsi. Paysera ir savs swift, tas ir reāls bankas konts, nav nekāds tipa paypal, emaksājums vai cita figņa
Paysera ir macinņš iekšējais konts tik pēc IBANa izskatās
PaySera ir normāla iestāde ar Lietuvas Centralās Bankas licenzi
Labi, maciņš ar licenzi un Sepu
Un ar ko tad banka diži labāka?
Var pieņemt noguldījumus? Nah tas vajadzīgs pie mūsdienu likmēm? Var noguldījumus izsniegt kredītos? Arī nah-nah!
Nu varbūt dokumentārās operācijas. Citas radikālas atšķirības īsti tā uzreiz iedomāties nevaru.
Ā, Lietuvas Centrālā Banka dažām ir izsniegusi tādas atļaujas ka ir izdevies viņas pabāzt zem noguldījumu garantiju likuma.[ Šo ziņu laboja Bron, 14 Feb 2018, 10:43:24 ] | | Offline | | |
| Bron | | 15. Feb 2018, 12:09 |
#2432
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| Kopš: 30. Aug 2002
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 15204
Braucu ar: Traktortehniku by Nissan
| Izskatās ka ABLV ap olām aptīta dzeloņdrāts:
According to information available to FinCEN, ABLV executives, shareholders, and employees have institutionalized money laundering as a pillar of the bank’s business practices. ABLV management orchestrates, and permits the bank and its employees to engage in, money laundering schemes. Management solicits the high-risk shell company activity that enables the bank and its customers to launder funds, maintains inadequate controls over high-risk shell company accounts, and is complicit in the circumvention of AML/CFT controls at the bank. As a result, multiple actors have exploited the bank in furtherance of illicit financial activity, including transactions for parties connected to U.S. and UN-designated entities, some of which are involved in North Korea’s procurement or export of ballistic missiles. In addition, ABLV management seeks to obstruct enforcement of Latvian AML/CFT rules. Through 2017, ABLV executives and management have used bribery to influence Latvian officials when challenging enforcement actions and perceived threats to their high-risk business.
ABLV’s business practices enable the provision of financial services to clients seeking to evade financial regulatory requirements. Bank executives and employees are complicit in their clients’ illicit financial activities, including money laundering and the use of shell companies to conceal the true nature of illicit transactions and the identities of those responsible. ABLV is considered innovative and forward leaning in its approaches to circumventing financial regulations. The bank proactively pushes money laundering and regulatory circumvention schemes to its client base and ensures that fraudulent documentation produced to support financial schemes, some of which is produced by bank employees themselves, is of the highest quality.
In 2014, ABLV was involved in the theft of over $1 billion in assets from three Moldovan banks, BC Unibank S.A., Banca Sociala S.A., and Banca de Economii S.A., in which criminals took over the three Moldovan banks using a non-transparent ownership structure, partly financed by loans from offshore entities banking at ABLV. Separately, ABLV previously developed a scheme to assist customers in circumventing foreign currency controls, in which the bank disguised illegal currency trades as international trade transactions using fraudulent documentation and shell company accounts.
As referenced in Section III of this notice, Latvian NRD banks cater to offshore shell companies, and ABLV is Latvia’s largest NRD bank. Offshore shell company business poses inherent money laundering risks because of its lack of transparency, and financial institutions must manage the risks associated with providing financial services to shell companies. As described in detail below, ABLV’s continuing failure to implement adequate AML controls commensurate with this high risk has caused the bank to facilitate transactions for shell companies owned or controlled by illicit actors engaged in transnational organized criminal activity, corruption, and sanctions evasion. Oftentimes, these actors take advantage of ABLV’s propensity to facilitate high-risk shell company business, using shell company accounts to obscure the transparency of their illicit activities.
ABLV does not mitigate these risks effectively. ABLV does not adequately conduct know-your-customer (KYC) checks or customer due diligence (CDD) on a number of its customers, does not collect or update supporting documentation from its customers to justify transactional activity, and uses fraudulent documentation in some of its CDD files. Furthermore, the bank has had deficiencies in its internal control system, including insufficient customer due diligence and monitoring of transactions.
In an example demonstrative of ABLV’s failures to mitigate these risks, ABLV received a substantial amount of funds from a Russia-based bank in a manner consistent with an illicit transfer of assets. FinCEN assesses that ABLV should have known that the shell companies receiving the Russian bank-sourced funds in their ABLV accounts were related to the ultimate beneficial owners of the Russia-based bank. Such a pattern is a hallmark of asset-stripping. In addition, ABLV has facilitated public corruption through the provision of shell company accounts for corrupt CIS-based politically exposed persons (PEPs) and other corrupt actors. Through 2014, for example, Ukrainian tycoon Serhiy Kurchenko funneled billions of dollars through his ABLV shell company accounts. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Kurchenko in 2015, finding that he was responsible for, complicit in, or had engaged in, directly or indirectly, the misappropriation of state assets of Ukraine or of an economically significant entity in Ukraine. ABLV maintained at least nine shell company accounts linked to Kurchenko. In another example, an Azerbaijani PEP engaged in large-scale corruption and money laundering used a shell company account at ABLV to make a payment.
ABLV’s business practice of banking high-risk shell companies without appropriate risk mitigation policies and procedures has also caused the bank to facilitate transactions for parties connected to U.S.- and UN-designated Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) entities. These designated entities include Foreign Trade Bank (FTB), Koryo Bank, Koryo Credit Development Bank, Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), and Ocean Maritime Management Company (OMM), some of which are involved in North Korea’s procurement or export of ballistic missiles. ABLV facilitated transactions related to North Korea after the bank’s summer 2017 announcement of a North Korea “No Tolerance” policy.Widely available public documents describe North Korean sanctioned entities’ use of front and shell companies and financial representatives to evade international sanctions. As early as 2014, the UN Panel of Experts (UN POE) noted in its report that sanctioned North Korean entities used front companies to evade international sanctions by hiding the sources of funds. Subsequent UN POE reports expanded on these findings, highlighting specific examples and methodologies used by North Korea-related entities to evade sanctions. Since 2011, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has called upon its members and urged all countries to apply effective countermeasures to protect their financial systems from the money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing threat emanating from the DPRK. More recently, the FATF has highlighted the DPRK's frequent use of front companies, shell companies, and opaque ownership structures for the purpose of evading international sanctions.
FinCEN has found that the DPRK is a foreign jurisdiction of “primary money laundering concern.”8 In its finding, FinCEN highlighted North Korea’s propensity to use front companies and agents to evade U.S. and international sanctions. Finally, nongovernmental research organizations have provided in-depth case studies of DPRK- linked entities’ use of front companies and representatives to evade international sanctions.
FinCEN assesses that the public nature of these reports, advisories, and actions should have provided ABLV the necessary guidance to apply appropriate due diligence to accounts and transactions that fit the typologies described in these public documents. However, ABLV’s pursuit of high-risk shell company business and its failure to heed these public warnings and implement an appropriate risk-mitigating CDD and KYC program enabled certain customers to exploit ABLV’s weaknesses to conduct transactions with parties connected to designated entities. Certain customers’ counterparties have also been designated by OFAC, further demonstrating their links to the DPRK.
Ninety percent of ABLV’s customers are high-risk per ABLV’s own risk rating methodology and are primarily high-risk shell companies registered in secrecy jurisdictions. FinCEN assesses that, beginning in 2012 and continuing into 2017, ABLV conducted a high volume of transactions for shell companies registered outside of Latvia in offshore secrecy jurisdictions totaling tens of billions of dollars. FinCEN is aware that ABLV frequently fails to respond to other financial institutions’ questions concerning the nature of the transactions that ABLV is processing. Multiple U.S. financial institutions have proactively closed ABLV’s U.S. correspondent accounts. Nonetheless, ABLV’s indirect correspondent activity with the U.S. financial system and its business model of facilitating non-transparent transactions for shell companies both continue.
While publicly stating that it is implementing plans to reform its AML/CFT compliance program, ABLV owners and executives have privately expressed an unwillingness to meaningfully alter ABLV’s high-risk business practices. This fact, combined with ABLV’s AML/CFT compliance issues to date raise serious concerns about the entity’s commitment to implementing these plans. These concerns are further supported by the fact that ABLV management seeks to obstruct enforcement of Latvian AML/CFT rules and has used bribery to influence Latvian officials. Any institution that undermines enforcement actions through such corrupt acts presents a significant risk that it will continue practices which facilitate illicit activity.[ Šo ziņu laboja Bron, 15 Feb 2018, 12:15:09 ] | | Offline | | |
| Zivis | | 15. Feb 2018, 12:41 |
#2433
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|  Kopš: 07. Nov 2011
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 747
Braucu ar: nēģi
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13 Feb 2018, 22:20:22 @zulus rakstīja:
13 Feb 2018, 21:56:15 @elbruss rakstīja:
13 Feb 2018, 21:05:09 @zulus rakstīja:
Negaidītāka ir FKTK totāla impotence un pohujisms.
Tieši FKTK impotence ir tas par ko neviens Latvijas finanšu sfērā strādājošais vairs nešaubās jau daudzus gadus. Un tas nav tikai banku dēļ.
Tas bija sarkasms, tāpat kā RVR postā... FKTK un arī Kontroles dienests ar veco sažuvušo pediņu Burkānu priekšgalā, kam tiešā veidā būtu jau sen jāizpurina dažas finanšu iestādes ir vienkārši impotences kalngals, kas pat necenšas imitēt NEKĀDAS darbības, lai vismaz izliktos noderīgi...
Man vecais stāstīja par Burkānu, tur ir maksimāls perēklis un neviens bez kukuļiem tirsu nekustina, bet tas jau ir LV standarts!
Kāds lieto tādu N26 MasterCard?
Var uzsūtīt karti no Vācijas un pilnvērtīgi lietot te, VIDs nekam netiekot klāt. | | Offline | | |
| korumpante | | 15. Feb 2018, 12:52 |
#2434
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|  Kopš: 29. May 2016
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 618
Braucu ar:
| Tās jau ir vecas ziņas, vids visam var tikt klāt, ja vien vēlas. https://support.n26.com/read/000001291?locale=en | | Offline | | |
| Bron | | 15. Feb 2018, 14:15 |
#2435
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| Kopš: 30. Aug 2002
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 15204
Braucu ar: Traktortehniku by Nissan
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13 Feb 2018, 21:56:15 @elbruss rakstīja:
13 Feb 2018, 21:05:09 @zulus rakstīja:
Negaidītāka ir FKTK totāla impotence un pohujisms.
Tieši FKTK impotence ir tas par ko neviens Latvijas finanšu sfērā strādājošais vairs nešaubās jau daudzus gadus. Un tas nav tikai banku dēļ.
Par FKTK impotenci un pohuismu jūs kontekstāar ABLV?
Kāpēc???
ABLV ir viena no 3 lielākajām Latvijas bankām un ir tiešā ECB uzraudzībā. FKTK ja ierodas pie viņiem tad tikai kā ECB pārstāvis, noskaidro ko lika noskaidrot, noziņo ECB un basta. Tālāk visus lēmumus pieņem ECB. | | Offline | | |
| zulus | | 16. Feb 2018, 12:26 |
#2436
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| Kopš: 18. Aug 2006
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 3328
Braucu ar:
| Aaaaiziet - "ABLV Bank" klientiem Latvijā uz laiku ir ierobežota "Visa" maksājumu karšu darbība | | Offline | | |
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| JankyLV | | 16. Feb 2018, 12:29 |
#2437
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|  Kopš: 23. Jul 2014
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 3039
Braucu ar: imperialblau
| Jāgaida FKTK un ABLV preses konferences, solīja ka šodien būs. Bet jā, visa apturējusi sadarbību. Mastercard un american express gan vēl strādājot. | | Offline | | |
| zulus | | 16. Feb 2018, 12:33 |
#2438
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| Kopš: 18. Aug 2006
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 3328
Braucu ar:
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16 Feb 2018, 12:29:19 @JankyLV rakstīja:
Jāgaida FKTK un ABLV preses konferences, solīja ka šodien būs. Bet jā, visa apturējusi sadarbību. Mastercard un american express gan vēl strādājot.
Vēl... ņemot vērā, cik bankas pēdējos 10 gados LV ir aizgājušas+to, ka ab.lv noguldījumu apmēri uz personu lielākajai daļai varētu būt virs valsts noteiktās garantijas - gan jau šie tagad lūdz dienu, lai nesāk masveidā piķi raut ārā/pārvest depozītus prom klienti.
Pietam, 16.gada pavasarī, ja pareizi atceros, FKTK jau piemēroja viņiem 3 vai 4 miljonu sodu+noslēdza vienošanos par kontroles sistēmu uzlabojumiem, tieši kas attiecas uz naudas atmazgāšanu un ter.finansējuma novēršanu; Šis, kas tagad notiek liek tikai domāt, ka piegājuši visam baigi formāli vai vispār uzlikuši mīksto... | | Offline | | |
| JankyLV | | 16. Feb 2018, 12:36 |
#2439
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| Kopš: 23. Jul 2014
No: Rīga
Ziņojumi: 3039
Braucu ar: imperialblau
| Protams, ka klienti jau mūk, jo negrib nekādu saistību ar šādu "kriminālo" banku. Redzēs cik nopietna tā prom mukšana būs. | | Offline | | |
| wanksta | | 16. Feb 2018, 12:39 |
#2440
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|  Kopš: 05. Jun 2012
Ziņojumi: 7370
Braucu ar: muti
| Kāds klientam sliktums no kriminālas bankas?
Man piemeram patiktu, ka neuzdod tik daudz debīlus jautājumus | | Offline | | |
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Moderatori: 968-jk, AV, BigArchi, BlackMagicWoman, Czars, GirtzB, Lafter, PERFS, RVR, SteelRat, VLD, linda, mrc, noisex, smudo
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